In this century philosophy and literary criticism and theory have followed two general orientations. One gives priority to language as mediating our knowledge of the world, the other subordinates language to sensory and perceptual experience, which language serves to mediate. The first view holds that language precedes experience "logically, ontologically, and genetically, and modifies and distorts experience."
The second gives priority to "the logical and ontological primacy of experience over language" (Koestenbaum xii) . These orientations are by no means mutually exclusive, but serve to indicate a primary emphasis on one or the other aspect. The orientation favoring language describes a general line from Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Mauthner, Saussure, and He idegger through structuralism, post-structuralism, and deconstruction; the second, originating in the philosophy of Husserl, reaches generally through phenomenology to existentialism and to the group of phenomenologist critics Sarah Lawall has called "the critics of consciousness."
The approach based on the primacy of language over experience assumes, as one commentator has put it, "that at least some, and perhaps all philosophical problems are the logical consequences of quasi-grammatical errors or ambiguities in the use of language." Husserl, on the other hand, "assumes that language reflects the structure of experience, or, if it does not, that we can examine experience independently of language" (Koestenbaum xii) . Today this latter notion, which disregards language as the vehicle through which experience is rendered, seems naive. But for the purpose of my argument, I would like to maintain a distinction between the emphasis on language and the emphasis on experience, even while recognizing that it is not absolute. ("Experience" is taken here to refer to perceptual and sensory experience and its cognitive effects.) My general argument is that writers of the early modernist generation, and certainly Musil, were not blocked by language's presumed inability to represent experience, but on the contrary were struggling to develop a new kind of literary language that would adequately represent experience as a cognitive process as it was then coming to be understood. Musil's extraordinary enterprise, in particular, does not seem amenable to structuralist or post-structuralist theoretical generalizations. He was a writer of fiction who was attempting to forge with the greatest possible precision a language of images that would portray the inexact process by which a character proceeds through life within the envelope of his individual perceptions, sensations, thoughts, and experiences. In The Man without Qualities Musil pushed this further, attempting to reconcile this process of individual perception with the utopian goal of a world in 2 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994] , Art. 7 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss2/7 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1351 which social institutions would be morally and ethically revitalized. The work of art was to point the way to this revitalization.
Musil' s was an experiment at once literary, scientific, and moral, and the language of fiction was for him the means to craft the revaluation and reintegration of values that Nietzsche and Mach had called for. He was not interested in discovering the relation of mind to world from an abstract point of view, but in experimentally integrating mind and world through the images and situations of the surrogate reality of fiction.
Where, aside from Nietzsche and Mach, was Musil coming from? His teachers and those who influenced him when he was young, the preand early phenomenologists Brentano, Mach, Stumpf, Husserl, and William James, were engaged in trying to counter the Newtonian and Cartesian reduction of the world to impersonal elements and mechanical processes, as expressed in the mid-nineteenth century by means of the reigning scientific paradigm of positivism. Positivism admitted as evidence only those things that could be measured and quantified; Dickens grotesquely caricatured it in the figure of Mr. Gradgrind in Hard Times. The direction the early phenomenologists took was the result of new insights into cognition and an ardent desire to unify human understanding on the basis furnished by idealistic philosophy. Their basic criticism was directed at what seemed to them a too narrow notion of science.' They were not out to reject positivism, but rather sought to broaden this then prevailing scientific paradigm by including among its empirical concepts a fluid continuum of reason plus sensation and feelings and not simply discrete measurable data alone, as constituting the totality of data on which scientific hypotheses should be based. As Alfred North Whitehead put it in 1925, "The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the nature ofthe case, you have abstracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded things are important in your experience, your modes of thought are not fitted to deal with them" (Whitehead 59).3 Musil offers the interesting case of a writer trained as a scientist for whom literature operates primarily on the basis of empirical perception and sensory experience and for whom language serves as the vehicle to represent experience. This argument implicitly rejects the idea that what literature conveys is graspable only through an analytic procedure that reduces it to rational or rationalized elements of language such as narrative and discourse. A writer, even an analytic writer like Musil, might be interested in pursuing other goals: in his case, as Philip Payne notes, this includes the winning back of the ground of the subject. This ground "has been lost," Payne says, "in the field of ideas, to the march of a militant objectivity which is both superficial and insensitive; it has been 3 lost in the field of morals with the sense that principles are written on tablets of stone rather than in the human heart; it has been lost in the field of science with the disappearance of the observer from the scope of what he observes" As a series of cognitive images, this kind of literature is primarily based on and appeals to an expanded notion of experience, using language as its vehicle. The writer seeks to engage the reader in the experience by creating verbal images that attempt to re-evoke the perceptual and sensory aura of the experience for the reader. Writers as ambitious as Proust or Musil will further seek ways to raise experience, understood in this fashion, to the level of the generally representative, so that it might serve a socially representative function as well-become cultural experience, as it were. The overwhelming focus of literary theory on language as discourse in recent times has not been very helpful in comprehending this notion. Language-based critics or theorists generally operate by positing or assuming language as the exclusive field of operations and then excerpting linguistic micro-features such as metaphors, metonyms, or discourses from a work and analyzing them narrowly within a structural, quasi-philosophical, political, ideological, or sociological context, without paying particular attention to other aspects or to the work as a whole.
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994] Scientific rationality and precision-still upheld as a primary value, but enlarged-is therefore to be seen as a variable that is a function of different contexts rather than a categorical summation of fixed points. Musil's self-imposed task as a writer was to find a literary language able to render with precision these "obscure, fuzzy, and cloudy clusters of experience."
Musil was born in 1880, the year Husserl turned twenty-one. This was the year in which Zola, in the conclusion to his essay "Le Roman experimental," called for a new kind ofnove I, one that would embody the unfolding discoveries of empirical science about the workings of mind and body in relation to the world. This new empirical method would replace the traditional conventions that reach back to classical drama and rhetoric with a new, experimental method, the triumph of which, Zola wrote, "is an inevitable evolution. Literature . . ," Zola goes on to say, "does not depend merely upon the author; it is influenced by the nature it depicts and by the man whom it studies. Now ifthe savants change their ideas of nature, if they find the true mechanism of life, they force us to follow them, to precede them even, so as to play our role in the new hypotheses. The metaphysical man is dead; our whole territory is transformed by the advent of the physiological man. No doubt," Zola continues, " 'Achilles' anger," Dido's love,' will last forever on account of their beauty; but today we feel the necessity of analyzing anger and love, of discovering exactly how such passions work in the human being . . . : we have become experimentalists instead of philosophers" (Zola 598-99).5
As a novelist and a firm believer in positivism, Zola tried to follow this program by combining affect and intellect in his construction of character and in his passages of narrative description. Zola's successors, although less confident about positivism than he was, attempted to fashion images in a new way that would reflect the complexities of cognition as it was then coming to be understood, and-still "scientific" in the experimental sense-would use art to expand knowledge. ( This might explain why Musil had trouble finishing anything, notably The Man without Qualities and his essays: the experimental path he set up, "the path of the smallest steps" as he called it, that would ultimately reconcile the potential of probability with the reality of what actually happens, can never end. This is a negative consequence of his dedication to a hypothetical approach that gives primacy to "a scale of degrees of probability," and that defines certainty as only the closest approach to the greatest achievable degree of probability-a kind of Zeno's arrow of probability suspended in its flight toward certainty.
Of course language as well as experience may be looked at as also constituting an amalgam of emotions and ideas, especially in the sequences of cognitive images that are a major feature of much modernist literature. Something of Musil's sophisticated awareness of this interdependence-in this respect he is unlike Husserl-can be indicated by an argument of Mary Hesse's that is very close to Musil' s conception. Hesse claims that meanings are not fixed in relation to universals or types, but "grow in dynamic interaction with culture and experience." If the meaning of words is thus changeable rather than fixed, the way to get beyond individual uses of each word is, Hesse argues, "to replace the Aristotelian model of `intuition of the universal,' which goes from particulars `up' to the universal and 'down again' to its other realizations, 9
by a model that goes 'horizontally' from particulars to particulars.
Members of a class . . . ," she argues, "are loosely grouped by relations of similarity and difference into fuzzy, overlapping, and temporarily defined classes whose boundaries change with experience and cultural convention" (Hesse 38 "encountered on the plane of ideas had the tensed, tightrope-walking nature of the once-and-never-again, and whenever they talked about it they did so in the awareness that no single word could be used twice without changing its meaning" (Musil, GW 4: 1400 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994] , Art. 7 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss2/7 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1351 a problem of discursive language. Finlay says that The Man without Qualities "is the discursive practice which is, par excellence, built up of the pragmatic material interaction of infinitely expanding fields of other discursive practices." The Man without Qualities, she says, "is not narrative; it is a constant narration made up of other narrations, a discourse of and with other discourses. Herein lies the major transformation that Musil's discursive practice effects on the procedures of the classical episteme, thus heralding the opening of the modern episteme" .
It is quite true that the problem of narrative was a central one for Musil, but it is misleading to focus on this only as a problem of discourse, in the current fashion, as Finlay and others have done. If a writer envisions experience as a complex floating membrane of thoughts, feelings, memories, and sensations that changes at every moment, and language likewise, then conventional techniques of narrative, and even some not so conventional, will appear reductive and impossibly simplistic, but discursive analysis alone is not capable of encompassing the phenomenon. A recurring image in Musil's fiction is that of puffy white clouds continually forming and reforming as the invisible force of the air moves them along against the background of a remote, unattainable blue sky.
These moving clouds are non-narrative and non-discursive, but they figure the billowing reality of experience that Musil is trying to encompass and express.
In his novella Tonka an impatient young middle-class scientist, whose understanding of the world is exclusively scientific and empirical, has an affair with a silent, uneducated working-class girl. Tonka, the girl in question, has a powerful intuitive understanding of the world, but cannot express herself at all through language. He is totally articulate, she is totally inarticulate. Musil' s problem was how to present their relationship as a flow of solipsistically individualized experience. At one point they are sitting at the edge of some woods, "and he was simply gazing into space though half-shut eyelids, not talking, letting his thoughts roam. Tonka began to be afraid she had offended him again. Several times she took a deep breath, as if about to speak, but then shyness held her back.
So for a long time there was no sound but the woodland murmur that is so tormenting, rising and sinking away in a different place at every instant. Once a brown butterfly fluttered past them and settled on a longstemmed flower, which quivered under the touch, swaying to and fro and then quite suddenly being quite still again, like a conversation broken off. Tonka pressed her fingers hard into the moss on which they were sitting, but after a while the tiny blades stood up again, one after the other, row on row, until there was finally no more trace of the hand that had lain living with him, are "changing to go out for the evening. There was no one in the house to help Agathe aside from Ulrich; they had started late and had thus been in the greatest haste for a quarter of an hour when a short pause intervened. Piece by piece, nearly all the ornaments of war a woman puts on for such occasions were strewn on the chairbacks and surfaces of the room, and Agathe was in the act of bending over her foot with all the concentration called for by the pulling on of a thin silk stocking. Ulrich was standing behind her. He saw her head, her neck, her shoulders, and this nearly naked back; her body was curved over her raised knees, slightly to the side, and the tension of this process sent three folds around
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994] , Art. 7 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss2/7 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1351 her neck, shooting slender and merry through her clear skin like three arrows: the charming physicality of this painting, escaped from the instantaneously spreading stillness, seemed to have lost its frame, and passed so abruptly and directly into Ulrich's body that he left the place he was standing and, not so entirely without consciousness as a banner being unfurled by the wind, but also not with deliberate reflection, crept closer on tiptoe, surprised the bent-over figure, and with gentle ferocity bit into one ofthose arrows, while his arm closed tightly around his sister. Then Ulrich's teeth just as cautiously released his overpowered victim; his right hand had grabbed her knee, and while with his left arm he pressed her body to his, he pulled her upright with him on upward-bounding tendons. Agathe cried out in fright." "Up to this point everything had taken place as playfully and jokingly as much that had gone on before, and even if it was tinged with the colors of love, it was only with the really shy intention of concealing love's unwonted dangerous nature beneath such cheerfully intimate dress. But when Agathe got over her fright, and felt herself not so much flying though the air as rather resting in it, suddenly liberated from all heaviness and directed in its stead by the gentle force of the gradually decelerating motion, it brought about one of those accidents which no one has in his power, that she seemed to herself in this state strangely soothed, indeed carried away from all earthly unrest; with a movement changing the balance of her body that she could never have repeated she also brushed away the last silken thread of compulsion, turned in falling to her brother, continued, so to speak, her rise as she fell, and lay, sinking down, as a cloud of happiness in his arms" (Musil, GW 4: 1081-82) . 12 Musil's notion that the task of literature is to represent with precision the fuzzy wholeness of experience was but one of many analogous attempts by modernist writers to try to find new and more accurate forms of expression. Even Henry James had written in 1888 that "experience is never limited, and it is never complete; it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber of consciousness, and catching every air-borne particle on its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind" (H. James 52).
The problem raised by many modernist writers is one central to phenomenological theory: a view of "consciousness" and "experience" such as Musil' to call it-in or on which all the conflicting and apparently unrelated fragments, self and world, feeling and intellect, science and society, skepticism and belief, could somehow be melded into a coherent, ethical whole. This might explain why the phenomonological basis is no longer fashionable in literary criticism and theory, and why language-based criticism, with its entrenched skepticism about idealist assumptions, has become dominant-it suits the temper of our time, which is disillusioned about any form of larger unity in the world. In the tradition of idealistic philosophy, phenomenology conceived experience as the experience of an individual person, but underlying the phenomenological enterprise was the intention of bringing about moral and ethical reform on the level of the larger community, and the belief that this could be done through an awakened subjectivity that would somehow expand outwards from the individual to the social and cultural world. Our time, however-as Musil himself trenchantly observed many times in his essays and in The Man without Qualities-has moved instead to a collectivist mode of thinking in which political, ideological, ethnic, and tribal thought and behavior rather than the individual's subjectivity have become the framework for social thought, and in which literary characters, no longer the anchoring centers of the world they had been since Romanticism, have become in extreme cases cartoon characters. In collectivist fashion the contemporary human sciences, psychology, medicine, and sociology approach the individual only as a statistical manifestation of generalized and abstracted characteristics. (Thus the disease is more important than the patient, who represents for the medical profession only a manifestation of it, a "case.")
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